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Abstract
In the canonical network model, the connections model, only three specific net-
work structures are generically efficient: complete, empty, and star networks.
This renders many plausible network structures inefficient. We show that re-
quiring robustness with respect to stochastic transmission failures rehabilitates
incomplete, circular network structures. Specifically, we show that near the “bi-
furcation” where both star and complete network are efficient in the standard
connections model, star and complete network are generally inefficient as trans-
mission failures become possible. As for four-player networks, we additionally
show that the circle network is uniquely efficient and robust near this bifurcation.
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1 Introduction
Most forms of communication take place within networks. This includes direct com-
munication within families and between friends, technical communication between
computers, and impersonal communication such as television and radio. For this rea-
son, communication networks have been analyzed fairly comprehensively, starting
with Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)’s seminal analysis of the “connections model”.
Jackson and Wolinsky showed that in networks with two-way information flow, where
the value of information decays over time, efficient (non-empty) networks are either
star-shaped or complete. The efficiency of stars explains the existence of TV sta-
tions for nation-wide communication, and the efficiency of completeness explains
communication within families. Subsequent research established this dichotomy of
economically efficient communication structures in many related circumstances. For
example, only star or complete networks are efficient if only the link initiator bears
the link costs (Bala and Goyal, 2000a; Hojman and Szeidl, 2008), if players are far-
sighted (Dutta et al., 2005), if link strength is endogenous (Bloch and Dutta, 2009),
if transfer payments between players are possible (Bloch and Jackson, 2007), and in
a slightly weakened form, the result holds true even if link costs are heterogenous
between players (Jackson and Rogers, 2005; Galeotti et al., 2006).
These results seem to assert that intermediate network structures are inefficient,
and in particular that incomplete, circular networks are wasteful. A well-known coun-
terexample to this assertion is the shape of computer networks. Computer networks
need to be “robust” to transmission failure and server downtime, in order to ensure
connectivity even if specific links or nodes disappear temporarily. In computer sci-
ence and combinatorics, this led to the analysis of expander graphs (for a survey, see
Hoory et al., 2006), which trade off robustness and number of links rather effectively,
although not “efficiently” in the economic sense. In general, the resulting networks
tend to be incomplete, which ensures cost efficiency, but also redundant and partially
circular, which ensures existence of alternative communication paths in case specific
links are unavailable temporarily.
In this paper, we argue that efficient friendship networks are redundant, circu-
lar, and incomplete for largely the same reason that computer networks are: com-
plete linking is too costly (i.e. too time-consuming, contrary to say within families),
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Figure 1: Elementary network structures
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but robustness is important as communication between friends is relatively sporadic
(contrary to say TV programs). We set up a simple model of networks with stochastic
information flow and show that redundancy and circularity indeed follow if link costs
are “intermediate”.
Our model extends the connections model by introducing stochastic link failure—
friends meet stochastically. The connections model with decay/discounting remains
included as a special case. The intuition underlying our result is that in the absence of
noise, utilities simply depend on the distances between players. With noise, expected
utilities also depend on the number of alternative paths between players, i.e. on the
degree of redundancy of links in the network. We derive expected utilities in closed
form and analyze welfare in various network structures. We analyze efficiency near
the “bifurcation” where both star and complete network are efficient in the connec-
tions model. In four-player networks, the circle becomes uniquely efficient near this
bifurcation as noise sets in, and for the case of more than four players, we show that
neither star nor complete network are efficient. Then, circular, redundant networks
such as the “wheel” (see Figure 4 below) improve welfare.
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to analyze a network with two-
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way information flow exhibiting both noise and decay. This extends the existing
literature, which has established efficiency of redundant, circular network structures
only in networks without decay, i.e. with perfectly patient players. In models of two-
way information flow, redundancy is efficient if communication is noisy (Bala and
Goyal, 2000b; Haller and Sarangi, 2005) or if link strength is endogenous (Deroïan,
2009; Bloch and Dutta, 2009). Circular structures also obtain in networks with one-
way information flow (Bala and Goyal, 2000a, and Kim and Wong, 2007). Another
difference to the earlier stochastic models is that Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller
and Sarangi (2005) analyze networks where links may fail to exist globally with a cer-
tain probability and agents maximize a utility function based on the expected number
of persons they will be connected to in the resulting network, whereas we explicitly
analyze information flow. Similarly to the aforementioned papers, we abstain from
modeling costs of information acquisition (Kannan et al., 2007), from discussing non-
cooperative implementation (Haller et al., 2007; Harrison and Muñoz, 2008) aside
from a brief discussion in the conclusion, and from modeling heterogeneous players
(Galeotti, 2006; Billand et al., 2008).
Section 2 introduces notation and elementary terms. Section 3 introduces our
model of stochastic information flow. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the four-player and
n-player networks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic notation and definitions
The set of network nodes (players) is denoted as N = {1,2, . . . ,n}, with 0 < n < ∞,
and players are denoted as i, j ∈ N. The existence of a link between players i, j ∈ N is
indicated through gi j ∈ {0,1}, where gi j = g ji = 1 indicates existence and gi j = g ji =
0 indicates non-existence. All links are undirected. The link matrix G = (gi j)i, j∈N
defines the “network” and G denotes the set of such networks. We write G ⊆ G′ if
gi j ≤ g′i j for all i, j ∈ N, and G⊂G′ if additionally G 6= G′. The network resulting by
adding the link i j (if not already existent) to network G is denoted as G∪{i j}.
The degree di(G) = ∑ j 6=i gi j of i ∈ N is the number of links in G involving i.
A node with degree d bears costs C(d) ∈ R. Costs are increasing in d and satisfy
C(0) = 0. For all G ∈ G , ui(G) ∈ R is i’s expected utility in G. Utility less costs is
ui(G)−C(di(G)), and a network is efficient if it maximizes the welfare ∑i∈N
[
ui(G)−
4
C(di(G))
]
over all G ∈ G .
A path between i and j (i 6= j) in G is p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk) such that p1 = i,
pk = j, pl ∈ N for all l ≤ k, gpl ,pl+1 = 1 for all l < k, and pl′ 6= pl′′ if l′ 6= l′′ for all
l′, l′′ < k. The set of paths between i and j in G is Pi j(G), and for all p ∈ Pi j(G), the
length of p is l(p). The distance li, j(G) between i and j is the length of the shortest
path connecting them in G, i.e. li, j(G) = ∞ if Pi j = /0, and li, j(G) = minp∈Pi j(G) l(p)
otherwise. A network G is connected if li, j(G)< ∞ for all i 6= j.
Figure 1 reviews the elementary network structures in case n = 5. If the number
of players is n > 5, the structures generalize as follows. A network G is empty if
gi j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N. It is complete if gi j = 1 for all i 6= j. The network is a star
if there exists k ∈ N such that gi j = 1 if and only if either i = k or j = k. It is linear
if there exists a bijection o : N→ N such that gi j = 1 if and only if |o(i)−o( j)|= 1.
It is called circle if there exists a bijection o : N → N such that gi j = 1 if and only
if o(i)− o( j) ≡ 1 (mod n) or o(i)− o( j) ≡ −1 (mod n). Finally, it is called quasi-
circle if it is incomplete and contains a circle.
3 A model of stochastic information flow
Definition
Consider a model of information flow where players communicate via emails. They
read and send emails in rounds (e.g. at night), they send them stochastically to a
selection of their contacts, and the emails sent contain all information that they have.
The choice whether any given contact is sent an email on a given day is random and
i.i.d. across contacts.
Definition 1 (Email model). The interaction proceeds in rounds. In round t = 0, a
random, non-empty selection of nodes N′⊂N is provided with a piece of information.
For all N′ ⊂ N, Pr(N′) denotes the probability that the information originates in N′.
In each round t ≥ 1, any i 6= j exchange information with probability gi j ·α, with α ∈
(0,1], and if they do, they exchange all information they possessed at the beginning
of the round. The value of the information that reaches i ∈ N in round t ≥ 0 is vi(t).
Define pii
(
t|N′,G), i ∈ N and t ≥ 0, as the probability that it takes exactly t
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rounds until the information reaches i in network G. For example, pii(0|N′) = 1 if
i ∈ N′, pii(0|N′) = 0 if i ∈ N \N′, and pii(t|N′) = 0 for all t if di(G) = 0 and i ∈ N \N′.
The expected value of information that originated in N′ ⊂ N is for any i ∈ N
ui(G|N′) =∑
t≥0
pii(t|N′,G) · vi(t), (1)
and overall i’s expected utility in G (not considering link costs) is
Eui(G) = ∑
N′⊂N
N′ 6= /0
Pr
(
N′
) ·ui(G|N′). (2)
The email model contains the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) as a
special case.
Example 2 (Connections model). Given some a > 0, the expected utility in the con-
nections model is ui(G) = a ·∑ j 6=i vi
(
li, j(G)
)
. This corresponds with the email model
if α= 1 and Pr(N′) = 1/n for all singletons N′, Pr(N′) = 0 otherwise.
In relation to the connections model, the email model therefore allows for the
probability of communication between connected players to be smaller than one.
Within either email or connections model, one may consider exponential discount-
ing, vi(t) = δt , δ ∈ [0,1], hyperbolic discounting, vi(t) = κ/(κ+ t), κ > 0, quasi-
linear discounting, vi(t) = max{0,1− t/η}, η> 0, or any other value function. After
establishing a few basic properties, we will focus on exponential discounting.
The email model is not the only way to model stochastic information flow in
networks. As an alternative, let us mention a “telephone model” where players meet
sequentially (in random order) and exchange all information they accumulated up to
the respective point in time. This telephone model does not contain the connections
model as a special case, however, and we are interested especially in the robustness
of efficienct structures as noise is added to the connections model.
Basic properties
Figure 2 defines two three-player networks that allow us to illustrate the basic prop-
erties. We look at these networks from the perspective of player 1, assuming he dis-
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counts exponentially, vi(t) = δt , and that links cost c = 0. Fix α ∈ (0,1] and assume
that the piece of information is initially known by either of the three players (deter-
mined by a uniform draw). In the star network NS, player 1 knows the information in
t = 0 with probability 1/3, and otherwise (if any other player learns the information
in t = 0) he learns it in t > 0 with probability α(1−α)t−1. In aggregate, 1’s expected
utility in the star network NS is
ui(NS) =
(
1 ·δ0+2 ·
∞
∑
t=1
α(1−α)t−1 δt
)
/3 =
(3α−1) δ+1
3 ((α−1) δ+1) . (3)
In the eyes of player 1, NC adds a seemingly redundant link between 2 and 3 to the star,
but if players communicate stochastically, this link establishes an alternative route for
the information to reach 1. Thus, it increases 1’s expected utility in relation to the
star. The expected utility of 1 in NC is
ui(NC) =
δ0
3
+
2
3
(
αδ+
∞
∑
t=2
δt
(
(1−α)2 t−3 α (2α−α2) (t−1)+(1−α)2 t−2 α)),
=
αδ
(
(α−1) (α2−3α+1) δ+1)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)2 . (4)
The utilities are equivalent only if α= 0 or α= 1, i.e. when players exchange infor-
mation each round with probability 1 (as in the connections model) or not at all. If
α ∈ (0,1), in turn, the link between 2 and 3 induces a positive externality for player
1, and this externality, albeit low in magnitude (see Figure 2c), will prove relevant.
Lemma 4 generalizes this observation and shows that links in the email model in-
duce positive externalities in general (i.e. under Assumption 3). Note the contrast to
the connections model (α = 1), where a link provides a positive externality to third
players only if it shortens the shortest path (“distance”) to or between them.
Assumption 3. α ∈ (0,1], G is connected, and for all i ∈ N : Pr({i})> 0 and vi(t) is
decreasing in t.
Lemma 4 (Positive externality). If α ∈ (0,1), then G⊂ G′⇒ ui(G)< ui(G′).
Proof. Fix any G ⊂ G′, define j′, j′′ ∈ N : j′ 6= j′′ such that g j′ j′′ = 0 and g′j′ j′′ = 1,
and define G′′ :=G∪{ j′ j′′}. As Pr({ j′})> 0, this implies ui(G′′|{ j′})> ui(G|{ j′}).
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Figure 2: The two connected three-player networks
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Since ui(G′′|N′) ≥ ui(G|N′) follows for all N′ ⊆ N by stochastic dominance, this
yields ui(G)< ui(G′′) and by induction ui(G)< ui(G′).
Now pick any network G satisfying Assumption 3 and consider the expected
number of rounds that it takes until a piece of information that originated in N′ = { j}
reaches i. Let Et(i, j,G) :=∑t≥0 t ·pii
(
t|{ j},G) denote this expectation. If α= 1, then
Et(i, j,G) = li, j(G); the duration has zero variance and it is independent of any link in
the network but those on the shortest path between i and j. In case α∈ (0,1), however,
Et(i, j,G) depends on all links in G, as implied by Lemma 4. Specifically, for any
α> 0, Et(i, j,G) is bounded above by α−1 · li, j(G), which results if there is only one
path between i and j (e.g. if G is linear), and it is bounded below by li, j(G), which
results if there are infinitely many paths between i and j. The following lemma shows
that the expected value of information originating in { j} is bounded correspondingly.
Thus, given α, the upper bound of utility over all email networks G is equal to the
utility in the connections model, while the lower bound illustrates the range of utilities
that may result by varying G even when li, j(G) is held constant. Thus, the difference
between these bounds is the maximal value of redundancy given the distance li, j(G).
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Lemma 5 (Bounds). For all l > 0 and α ∈ (0,1], the expected value of information
in all G ∈ G satisfying li, j(G) = l satisfies
∑
t≥l
(
l−1
t−1
)
αt(1−α)t−l · vi(t)≤ ui(G|{ j})≤ vi(l), (5)
and both bounds are tight.
Proof. By Lemma 4, the lower bound obtains in any minimal network G where i
and j have distance l (i.e. in any G such that @G′ ⊂ G : li, j(G′) = l). Any such
minimal network G is “linear” in the sense that Pi j(G) is a singleton, and i’s expected
utility in G is equal to the lower bound above. Also by Lemma 4, the upper bound is
approximated in any maximal network G where i and j have distance l (i.e. in any G
such that @G′ ⊃ G : li, j(G′) = l), as the number of nodes n tends to infinity. For any
n < ∞, any maximal network G with li, j(G) = l has the following structure. There
exists a mapping o from N onto {1,2, . . . , l−1} such that for all k /∈ {i, j} : gik = 1 iff
o(k) = 1 and g jk = 1 iff o(k) = l− 1, and such that for all k,k′ /∈ {i, j} : gkk′ = 1 iff
|o(k)−o(k′)|= 1. It is easy to verify that any network violating this structure is either
not maximal or does not satisfy li, j(G) = l, and that any network with this structure
satisfies li, j(G) = l. The supremum of the expected utility is the limit of ui(G|{ j}) in
such networks as n tends to infinity and is equal to the claimed bound.
Lower and upper bound equate in case α = 1, i.e. in the connections model. In
all other cases, the network structure matters beyond mere distances li, j(G), which
will be shown to affect network efficiency in the next section.
4 Efficiency in four-player networks
From now on, we assume for simplicity that all players are equally likely to origi-
nate information, and that only single players may originate new information. This
assumption is standard in the sense that any i ∈ N thus weighs all opponents j 6= i
equally. In conjunction with standard linearity and symmetry assumptions, this im-
plies the utility assumed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) if we set α= 1.
Assumption 6. Pr(N′) = 1/n for all singleton sets N′ ⊆ N and Pr(N′) = 0 otherwise.
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Costs are linear, C(d) = c ·d with c∈R+, and value functions are symmetric between
players, vi = v j for all i 6= j.
Note that we normalize utilities differently than Jackson and Wolinsky do. We
consider expected utilities, which essentially normalizes them by dividing through
1/n. If n= 4, this implies that the costs thresholds discussed below are 1/4 of Jackson
and Wolinsky’s. Now, recall the general result for the symmetric connections model.
Proposition 7 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). If α= 1, the efficient network is either
empty, complete, or star for almost all c ∈ R+.
Both star and complete network are efficient if c = v(1)− v(2), i.e. if the gain
from abbreviating an indirect connection through establishing a direct one equates
with the costs of this connection. At this “bifurcation”, actually all networks with
diameter one or two are efficient. Besides stars and complete networks, this contains
circles and quasi-circles (Figure 1) in the four-player case. In this section, we derive
the expected utilities of the players in all these networks, see Figure 3 for a first glance
at the results, and then we evaluate efficiency in case α ≈ 1. Near the bifurcation,
the circle will be uniquely efficient, and since it does not extend the star by adding
connections, this shows that qualitatively different structures emerge if robustness
with respect to even infinitesimal noise is required.
Proposition 8 (Four players). Fix n = 4, δ > 1/6, and vi(t) = δt for all i. If costs c
are such that complete network and star network induce the same welfare at α = 1,
then there exists α< 1 such that the circle is uniquely efficient for all α ∈ (α,1).
Proposition 8 is proved through a sequence of lemmas that characterize welfare
in the various candidate networks and by a subsequent analysis of the neighborhood
of α = 1 to obtain. The four networks relevant in the efficiency analysis are the star
network (Fig. 1d), the circular network (Fig. 1c), the quasi-circular network (Fig. 1e),
and the complete network (Fig. 1f). It is straightforward to show that the only remain-
ing network that can be efficient (in case n = 4) is the empty network, in which the
aggregate expected utility is 1. We start with the star (briefly allowing for any n≥ 4,
which will be useful in the next section) and the complete network. The proofs of
these lemmas are straightforward but tedious, due to the large number of case distinc-
tions and indefinite sums to be evaluated, and therefore relegated to the appendix.
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Figure 3: Regions of efficiency
(a) Regions of efficiency in case δ= 0.9
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(b) Regions of efficiency in case δ= 0.6
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Note: The lines mark the boundaries of the (α,c)-regions where specific network structures are effi-
cient. Above the upmost line, the empty network is efficient, between upmost and second line, the star
is efficient, and subsequently, circle, quasi-circle, and complete network are efficient (in this order).
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Lemma 9. In the n-player star network Sn, the expected utility of the central player
is un(Sn) and that of any peripheral player i 6= n is ui(Sn) as defined next.
un(Sn) =
δ (αn−1)+1
((α−1) δ+1) n ui(S
n) =
δ2
(
α2 n−3α+1)+(3α−2) δ+1
((α−1) δ+1)2 n
Lemma 10. In the four-player complete network C4, the expected utility of i ∈ N is
ui(C4) =
(α−1)4 (4α6−24α5+60α4−74α3+36α2−9α+1)δ3+
(α−1)(2α6−10α5+35α4−71α3+67α2−23α+3)δ2+(α4−6α3+12α2−13α+3)δ−1
4
(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2(
(α−1)4 δ−1
) .
Now let us compare the social welfares of these two networks. If δ > 1/2 and
we decrease α starting at the bifurcation where star and complete network are equally
efficient, the welfare of the complete network starts to exceed that of the star.
d∑i∈N ui(C4)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(S
4)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
3 (δ−1) δ (2δ−1)
2
<
δ>1/2
0. (6)
That is, the aggregate utility in the complete network decreases more slowly than that
in the star network if δ > 1/2. This is surprising, as network links lose in value (in
absolute terms) as α decreases, and yet the complete network gains in efficiency on
the star. Thus, the welfare gain of adding links is not generally increasing in α, nor is
it generally decreasing in α, as can be checked easily for δ< 1/2.
Corollary 11. G′ ⊂ G′′ does not imply that ∑i∈N ui(G′)−∑i∈N ui(G′′) is monotonic
in α.
This kind of non-monotonicity obstructs general analyses substantially. Further,
Eq. (6) may also suggest that the complete network (for δ> 1/2) also induces higher
welfare than any other incomplete network as we decrease α starting in the bifurca-
tion. This would imply that the complete network is uniquely efficient in this neigh-
borhood. This is not the case, however, as we show by looking at the quasi-circle.
Lemma 12. In the four-player quasi-circular network Q4, the expected utilities of the
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degree-3 players is u1(Q4) and those of the degree-2 players is u2(Q4), with
u1(Q4) =
(α−1)6 (4α5−20α4+38α3−26α2+8α−1)δ4−(α−1)3 (2α6−16α5+60α4−107α3+86α2−30α+4)δ3−
(α−1)(2α5−17α4+55α3−73α2+36α−6)δ2−(3α3−10α2+14α−4)δ−1
4
(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)3
u2(Q4) =
(α−1)5 (4α5−20α4+36α3−22α2+7α−1)δ4−2(α−1)2 (2α6−13α5+39α4−58α3+41α2−14α+2)δ3+
(α6−10α5+41α4−84α3+83α2−36α+6)δ2+2(α3−4α2+6α−2)δ+1
4
(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)2(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2 .
Again, look at the derivatives of the aggregate utilities.
d∑i∈N ui(Q4)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(C
4)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
(δ−1) δ
2
< 0. (7)
For all δ, decreasing α increases the aggregate utility in the quasi-circular network
in relation to that of the complete network. Thus, the efficient network in the neigh-
borhood is incomplete. In conjunction with the above result that the welfare gain of
adding all links in C4 \S4 to the star is decreasing in α, this implies that the last link’s
value is increasing in α, while the other links’ values are decreasing in α.
Corollary 13. G′⊂G′′ with g′i j = g′′i j = 0 does not imply∑i∈N ui
(
G′∪{i j})−∑i∈N ui(G′)>
∑i∈N ui
(
G′′∪{i j})−∑i∈N ui(G′′) or vice versa.
Hence, network links are complementary in terms of the value they create. An
additional link may be welfare improving only if specific other links are present. This
is intuitive, but it poses another obstacle to general analyses, as it shows that the
aggregate structure needs to be analyzed as a whole. To conclude our analysis, let us
now look at the circle.
Lemma 14. In the four-player circular network O4, the expected utility of i ∈ N is
ui(O4)=
(α−1)2 (4α4−16α3+14α2−6α+1)δ3−(2α4−18α3+30α2−16α+3)δ2+(3α2−8α+3)δ−1
4((α−1)2 δ−1)3
.
Now, the derivatives of the aggregate utilities are
d∑i∈N ui(O4)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(Q
4)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
(δ−1) δ
2
< 0. (8)
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In relation to Eq. (7), this shows that both diagonal links are equally useful at α≈ 1.
For all δ ∈ (0,1), the circle therefore becomes more efficient relative to the quasi-
circle as α decreases. Since the costs remain constant, this implies that the circle
induces higher welfare than the quasi-circle near the bifurcation. The following con-
cludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8. Social welfares in star and complete networks are equal at
α = 1 if c = (1−δ) δ/4. Using these costs and α = 1, the social welfare in all
considered networks (i.e. in all four-player networks with diameter 1 or 2) is 3δ2 +
1. Since the expected utilities in all cases are continuous in α, the welfare in all
considered networks remains greater than 1 in the neighborhood of c = (1−δ) δ/4
and α = 1. Since the empty network generally induces welfare 1, it is therefore
not efficient in any such neighborhood. Further, as shown above, Eq. (8), the circle
is more efficient than the quasi-circular network in the neighborhood of α = 1 for
all δ ∈ (0,1). By Eq. (7) and transitivity, this applies with respect to the complete
network as well, and the relation to the star is
d∑i∈N ui(O4)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(S
4)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
(δ−1) δ (6δ−1)
2
<
δ<1/6
0. (9)
Thus, the circle is the efficient network for all δ≥ 1/6.
Thus, structures differing qualitatively from star and complete networks emerge
if we require robustness to communication failures in the connections model. The
following section shows that this result obtains similarly in n-player networks.
5 Efficiency in large networks
In networks with n > 4 players, the circular network is not generally efficient any-
more. To see this, recall that at the bifurcation discussed above, all networks with
diameter 1 or 2 are efficient, while the circle has a diameter of at least 3 if n > 5.
Further, many relevant intermediate network structures exist for general n, i.e. many
plausible networks on the transition from star to complete network. We obtain a gen-
eral result, however, by showing that a full wheel (Figure 4) is more efficient than
both star and complete network near the bifurcation, which obviously implies that
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Figure 4: Two “Wheel” networks
(a) A sparse wheel
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(b) The full wheel
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11
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neither star nor complete network are efficient. Note that we use the term wheel to
refer to a circle with “spokes” while the literature following Bala and Goyal (2000a)
refers to directed circles as wheels.
Definition 15 (Wheels). A network G is called wheel if there exists k ∈ N such that
the network on N \{k} is a circle and gik = 1 for at least one i 6= k. It is a full wheel
if gik = gki = 1 for all i 6= k.
Proposition 16. Fix n > 4 and δ > 1/3. There exist α ≈ 1 and c ≈ δ(1− δ)/n such
that the full wheel induces a strictly higher welfare than both star and complete net-
work.
Proposition 16 implies that incomplete, redundant structures generally emerge if
robustness with respect to noise is required, i.e. not just in case n= 4. Its proof differs
from the proof of Proposition 8 in that closed-form representations of the expected
utilities for general numbers of players n > 4 and arbitrary probabilities α ∈ (0,1)
are not available. These payoffs can be characterized by Taylor expansion in the
neighborhood of α = 1, however, which we exploit. The expected utilities in stars
have already been derived in Lemma 9. We proceed by characterizing the payoffs in
complete networks (for arbitrary n).
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Lemma 17. Let ui(Cn) denote the expected utility of i ∈ N in the n-player complete
network Cn. For any n > 3 and any ε≥ 0 there exists ε′ ≥ 0 such that
∣∣ui(Cn)− u˜i(Cn)∣∣≤ ε and ∣∣dui(Cn)/dα−du˜i(Cn)/dα∣∣≤ ε
for all α ∈ [1− ε′,1], with
u˜i(Cn) =
(
(1−α) α2n−3 δ2+αδ) (n−1)+1
n
.
Essentially, Lemma 17 exactly characterizes the expected utility, in terms of
value and first derivative with respect to α, in α = 1. In relation to the expected
utilities in the n-player star network, provided by Lemma 9, it implies that the obser-
vation in Eq. (6) that the star is inferior to the complete network (if δ > 1/2) in the
neighborhood of the bifurcation generalizes to n > 4.
d∑i∈N ui(Cn)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(S
n)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
(δ−1) δ (2δ−1) (n−2) (n−1)
n
<
δ>1/2
0 (10)
The next lemma provides a similar characterization for the payoffs in the full
wheel. Here, we focus on the expected payoffs in wheels of at least eight players. For,
a large number of alternative paths along which the information can spread through
the wheel have to be distinguished, and in case n≥ 8, all such paths can be analyzed
in a unified manner. The cases n = 5,6,7 can be analogously to n ≥ 8, but the case
distinctions need to be adapted. We verified that the results reported for n≥ 8 continue
to hold similarly if n = 5,6,7 (details are available from the authors).
Lemma 18. Let ui(W n) denote the expected utility of i ∈ N in the n-player full wheel.
For any n≥ 8 and any ε≥ 0 there exists ε′ ≥ 0 such that
∣∣ui(W n)− u˜i(W n)∣∣≤ ε and ∣∣dui(W n)/dα−du˜i(W n)/dα∣∣≤ ε
for all α ∈ [1− ε′,1], with
u˜i(W n) =
−
[
(α−1)α2 δ3 (n−1)(α4 n−3α3 n+3α2 n+n−2α6+10α5−26α4+34α3−20α2−8)
−α2 δ2 (n−1)(n−2α4+8α3−12α2+2)−n−4αδ(n−1)
]
/n2
.
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Now, if we look at the derivatives of the aggregate utilities,
d∑i∈N ui(Cn)
dα
− d∑i∈N ui(W
n)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
(δ−1) δ (n−1) ((2δ−1) n−4 (3δ−1))
n
,
we find that the difference is not generally positive or negative. The sign depends on
(2δ−1) n ≷ 4 (3δ−1). If n is large, then (2δ−1) n > 4 (3δ−1), the difference is
negative, and thus complete networks gain on wheels as α decreases (i.e. if α< 1 and
c held constant). In turn, if n is small or δ intermediate, e.g. δ = 0.5, then the term
is positive and the wheel gains on the complete network if α decreases. Since social
welfare induced in wheels and complete networks equate at the bifurcation (for α =
1), the effect of decreasing α thus requires further analysis. By additionally taking
cost variations into account, we can show that there are (α,c) near the bifurcation
such that the wheel improves upon both complete network and star.
Proof of Proposition 16. At α = 1 and c = δ(1− δ)/n, all networks with diameter
no more than 2 induce the same social welfare. Their welfare is also strictly greater
than 1, which is the welfare induced by the empty network. As expected utilities are
continuous in α and c, all networks with diameter 1 or 2 thus induce strictly greater
welfare than the empty network in the neighborhood of α = 1 and c = δ(1− δ)/n.
It remains to show that there is a trajectory (dα,dc) along which the differences in
welfare between wheel and star, on the one hand, and between wheel and complete
network, on the other, increases. Using
kW,S =−
d∑i∈N
(
ui(W n)−ui(Sn)
)
/dα
d∑i∈N
(
ui(W n)−ui(Sn)
)
/dc
=
(δ−1) δ (4δ−1)
n
kW,C =−
d∑i∈N
(
ui(W n)−ui(Cn)
)
/dα
d∑i∈N
(
ui(W n)−ui(Cn)
)
/dc
=
(δ−1) δ ((2δ−1) n−4 (3δ−1))
(n−4) n ,
the proposition follows from
kW,C− kW,S = 2 (1−δ) δ
2 (n−2)
(n−4) n > 0. (11)
For, along the trajectory (dα,dc) = (−1,−k) both welfare differences (wheel in
relation to star and wheel in relation to complete network) increase for any k ∈
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(kW,S,kW,C), and by Eq. (11) the interval (kW,S,kW,C) is generally not empty.
6 Conclusion
The paper analyzed efficiency of networks with stochastic information transmission.
We set up a simple model that contains the connections model (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996) as a special case and evaluated network efficiency as noise is small. We
found that the standard result that either star or complete networks are efficient, if
links are formed at all, no longer holds true even for small levels of noise in meet-
ing/transmission stochastics. Instead, incomplete, redundant networks become effi-
cient. Figures 3 and 5 illustrate that these results generalize directly to case with
substantial noise and to alternative valuation functions. Our analysis thus rehabili-
tates efficiency of a variety of intermediate network structures between the minimal
star and the maximal complete network on which the existing literature has focused.
We derived expected utilities in networks with stochastic temporary link unavail-
ability based on exact analyses of arrival times and information flow in the network.
Previous work of Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller and Sarangi (2005) analyzed
connectivity in networks with stochastic, but permanent node unavailability. We did
not touch strategic stability, but for the circle in four-player networks, as an example,
pairwise stability follows immediately. Cutting a link in the circle yields a linear net-
work, which has diameter 3 and is therefore not stable near the bifurcation. In turn,
adding a link yields a quasi-circle (see Figure 1), which was shown to reduce welfare,
and by the existence of positive externalities of additional links (Lemma 4), this im-
plies that the players adding the link suffer. Hence, there are no gains from pairwise
deviations.
The approach underlying our analysis, the analysis of stochastic information
flow, can be applied similarly to networks with large numbers of players and links, at
the very least by Monte Carlo simulation. We have seen that link complementarities
obtain (see e.g. Cor. 13), which is intuitive and strongly suggests that the set of ef-
ficient network structures will adhere to certain regularities. A better understanding
of these complementarities may thus yield a precise characterization of the “interme-
diate” network structures that are efficient in the presence of noise even if n is large,
which seems to be an interesting task for future research.
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Figure 5: Efficient structures for various unavailability rates α
Note: The valuation vi(t) is the value of information that is learned after t rounds, α is the probability that
a link is unavailable in a given round (i.i.d. across links and across rounds), and c are the costs of link
formation. The expected utilities of the players are given next to their nodes.
(a) Exponential utility vi(t) = δt with δ= 0.8
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(b) Hyperbolic utility vi(t) = κ/(κ+ t) with κ= 4
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(c) Quasi-linear utility vi(t) = max{0,1− t/η} with η= 7
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A Relegated proofs
Throughout this section, let ui( j) denote i’s expected utility in a given network G if
only j currently has the information, and let pii(t| j) denote the probability that the
information reaches i in round t. Further, define the random variable Di( j), for all
i, j ∈ N, as the number of rounds it takes until the information, originally known by
j, reaches i.
Proof of Lemma 9 (Star, n nodes) Let player n be the central player and players
1, . . . ,n−1 be the peripheral players. Thus, the expected utility of n if only i 6= n has
the information is
un(i) = α
∞
∑
t=1
(1−α)t−1 δt = αδ
1− (1−α) δ .
Using un =
(
1+(n−1)un(i)
)
/n and rearranging terms yields the claimed expression.
Second, for all i 6= n, ui is defined as ui =
(
1+ ui(n) + (n− 2)ui( j)
)
/n, with j ∈
N \{i,n}, where ui(n)≡ un(i) and
ui( j) = α2
∞
∑
t=1
(1−α)t−2 δt (t−1) = α
2 δ2
(αδ−δ+1)2 .
Proof of Lemma 10 (Complete, 4 nodes) The expected utility is derived by distin-
guishing four cases. Case A: Di( j)≤ Dk( j) for all i 6= j, i 6= k, j 6= k.
ui( j|A) = α
∞
∑
t=1
(1−α)3 t−3 δt = αδ
(α−1)3 δ+1 .
Case B: Dk( j)< Di( j) for exactly one k 6= i, j (i.e. one player other than i learns the
information before i). The probability that i learns it in t ≥ 2 is
pii(t| j,Case B) = α
(
1− (1−α)2
) t−1
∑
d=1
(1−α)4 t−d−5 = (1−α)
3 t (α−2) α (α+(1−α)t−1)
(1−α)5 ,
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and i expected utility conditional on case B is
ui( j|B) =
∞
∑
t=2
pii(t| j,Case B) ·δt = (α−2) (α−1)
2 α2 δ2(
(α−1)3 δ+1
) (
(α−1)4 δ−1
) .
Case C: Dk( j) = Dk′( j) < Di( j) for k 6= k′ and both different from i and j. The
expected utility in this case is
ui( j|C) =
(
1− (1−α)3
)
α2
∞
∑
t=2
(1−α)3 t−5 δt (t−1) = (1−α) α
3 (α2−3α+3) δ2(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2 .
Case D: Dk( j)< Dk′( j)< Di( j). The probability that i learns it in t ≥ 3 this way is
pii(t| j,Case D) =
(
1− (1−α)2
) (
1− (1−α)3
)
α
t−2
∑
d1=1
t−1
∑
d2=d1+1
(1−α)3 t+d2−d1−6
=
(1−α)3 t (α−2) α (α2−3α+3) ((α−1) α t−α2− (1−α)t +1)
(α−1)6
and consequently the expected utility in case D is
ui( j|D) =
∞
∑
t=3
pii(t| j,Case D) ·δt =
(α−2) (α−1)4 α3 (α2−3α+3) δ3(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2 (
(α−1)4 δ−1
) .
Overall, i’s utility is ui =
{
1+(n−1)[ui( j|A)+2ui( j|B)+ui( j|C)+2ui( j|D)]}/n.
Proof of Lemma 12 (Quasi-circle, 4 nodes) Label players similar to Figure 1e, i.e.
players 1 and 3 have degree 3, players 2 and 4 have degree 2. We begin with deter-
mining the expected utility of 1 if the information is initially with 2 (or symmetrically
4). Three cases are distinguished here. Case A: D1(2)≤ D3(2).
u1(2|A) = α
∞
∑
t=1
(1−α)2 t−2 δt =− αδ
(α−1)2 δ−1
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Case B: D3(2)< D1(2)≤D4(2), i.e. 3 learns it before 1 (and may therefore tell him),
but 4 does not.
u1(2|B) =
(
1− (1−α)2
)
α
∞
∑
t=2
δt
t−1
∑
d=1
(1−α)3 t−d−4
=− (α−2) (α−1) α
2 δ2(
(α−1)2 δ−1
) (
(α−1)3 δ+1
)
Case C: D3(2)< D4(2)< D1(2), i.e. both 3 and 4 learn it before 1 and may tell him.
u1(2|C) =
(
1− (1−α)3
)
α2
∞
∑
t=3
δt
t−2
∑
d3=1
(1−α)3 t−d3−5 (t−d3−1)
=
(α−1)3 α3 (α2−3α+3) δ3(
(α−1)2 δ−1
) (
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2
In aggregate, the expected utility of 1 if 2 gets the information first is the sum of the
expected utilities in these basic cases, and rearranging a little, this yields
u1(2)=
αδ
(
(α−1)3 (α4−5α3+9α2−5α+1) δ2− (α−1) (3α2−6α+2) δ−1)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
) (
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2 .
The expected utility of 1 conditional on 3 getting the information first is determined
similarly. Three cases are distinguished implicitly, namely (i) D1 ≤ D2,D4, (ii) D2 <
D1 ≤ D4 or D4 < D1 ≤ D2, (iii) D2,D4 < D1, and in aggregate, the following results.
u1(3) = α
∞
∑
t=1
(1−α)3 t−3 δt +2α
(
1− (1−α)2
) ∞
∑
t=2
(1−α)3 t−4 δt (t−1)
+
(
1− (1−α)3
)
α2
∞
∑
t=2
(1−α)3 t−5 δt (t−1)2
=
αδ
(
(α−1)4 (α4−5α3+10α2−6α+1) δ2− (α−1) (α4−α3−5α2+8α−2) δ+1)(
(α−1)3 δ+1
)3
Aggregate over all three cases, the expected utility of 1 is u1 =
[
1+2u1(2)+u1(3)
]
/n,
and rearranging a little, the claimed term results.
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Next, let us consider the expected utility of 2 (symmetrically that of 4). First,
assume 1 gets the information first, and as before, distinguish three cases, A, B, and
C. Case A: D2 ≤ D3. Conditional on A, the probability that 2 learns it in t ≥ 1 is
pi2(t|1,A) = (1−α)3 t−4 α2 (t−1)+(1−α)3 t−3 α.
Case B: D3 ≤ D4 and D3 < D2. The probability of t ≥ 2 conditional on B is
pi2(t|1,B)=α
(
1− (1−α)2
) t−1
∑
d3=1
(1−α)2 t+d3−4 = (1−α)
2 t (α−2) α (α+(1−α)t−1)
(α−1)4 .
Case C: D4 < D3 < D2. The probability of t ≥ 3 conditional on C is
pi2(t|1,C) =
(
1− (1−α)2
)2
α
t−1
∑
d3=2
(1−α)2 t+d3−5 (d3−1)
=
(1−α)2 t (α−2)2 α ((1−α)t α t−α2−2 ((1−α)t−1) α+(1−α)t−1)
(α−1)5
Now, aggregating over these three cases, the expected utility of 2 if 1 gets the infor-
mation first is
u2(1) =
∞
∑
t=1
δt pi2(t|1,A)+
∞
∑
t=2
δt pi2(t|1,B)+
∞
∑
t=3
δt pi2(t|1,C)
=
αδ
(
(α−1)3 (α4−5α3+9α2−5α+1) δ2− (α−1) (3α2−6α+2) δ−1)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
) (
(α−1)3 δ+1
)2
Finally, we proceed similarly to determine the expected utility of 2 if 4 gets the in-
formation first. Case A: D1 = D3, i.e. they cannot have learned it from one another,
and one of them will tell 2. The probability of the information arriving in round t ≥ 2
conditional on A is
pi2(t|4,A) = (1−α)2 t−4 α2
(
2α−α2) (t−1) .
Case B: D1 < D2 ≤ D3 or D3 < D2 ≤ D1. The probability of t ≥ 2 conditional on B
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is
pi2(t|4,B) = α2
t−1
∑
d=1
(1−α)3 t−d−4 =−(1−α)
2 t α
(
α+(1−α)t−1)
(α−1)4
Case C: D1,D3 < D2. The probability of t ≥ 3 conditional on C is
pi2(t|4,C) =
(
1− (1−α)2
)2
α
t−2
∑
d1=1
t−1
∑
d3=d1+1
(1−α)2 t+d3−d1−5
=
(1−α)2 t (α−2)2 α ((α−1) α t−α2− (1−α)t +1)
(α−1)5
Aggregating again, we obtain the expected utility of 2 in case 4 gets the information
first.
u2(4) =
∞
∑
t=2
δt pi2(t|4,A)+2
∞
∑
t=2
δt pi2(t|4,B)+2
∞
∑
t=3
δt pi2(t|4,C)
=
α2 δ2
(
(α−1)2 (α3−5α2+8α−2) δ−α2+2)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)2 (
(α−1)3 δ+1
)
Thus, the expected utility of 2 overall is u2 =
[
1+ 2u2(1)+ u2(4)
]
/n, which yields
the claimed term.
Proof of Lemma 14 (Circle, 4 nodes) Consider a circular network similar to Figure
1c, i.e. 1 is linked with 2 and 4, 2 is linked with 1 and 3, and so on. First consider the
expected utility of 1 if the information is initially with 2 (or symmetrically with 4, i.e.
his neighbor).
u1(2) = αδ+(1−α) αδ2+
∞
∑
t=3
δt
(
(1−α)2 t−3 α2 (t−1)+(1−α)2 t−2 α
)
+α2
(
2α−α2) ∞∑
t=3
(1−α)2 t−4 δt
(
t−1
2
)
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Simplifying the sums and rearranging terms, we obtain
u1(2) =
αδ
(
(α−1)2 (α3−4α2+3α−1) δ2+(α−1) (3α−2) δ−1)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)3 .
Next, the expected utility of 1 if 3 (the opposite player) gets the information first is
u1(3) = α2
(
2α−α2) ∞∑
t=2
(1−α)2(t−2) δt (t−1)2+2α2
∞
∑
t=2
(1−α)2 t−3 δt (t−1)
=
α2 δ2
(
(α−1)2 (α2−4α+2) δ+α2−2)(
(α−1)2 δ−1
)3 ,
and the expected utility of 1 results as u1 =
[
1+2∗u1(2)+u1(3)
]
/4. By symmetry,
u1 = ui for all i ∈ N.
Proof of Lemma 17 (Complete, n nodes) Given the continuity of both ui(CN) and
u˜i(CN) in the neighborhood of α= 1, it suffices to show that
ui(Cn)− u˜i(Cn)
∣∣∣∣
α=1
= 0 and
dui(Cn)
dα
− du˜i(C
n)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
= 0. (12)
In general, it is possible to rearrange ui into sums of products of the form
ui =
∞
∑
n=0
(1−α)n fn(α) u˜i =
∞
∑
n=0
(1−α)n f˜n(α)
such that no fn(α), n ≥ 0, is still divisible by (1−α), nor any f˜n(α). Eq. (12) holds
for any u˜i that satisfies f0 = f˜0 and f1 = f˜1. That is, we have to characterize all paths
of information flow that require 0 or 1 failed meeting in total.
In complete networks, there are exactly two such paths of information flow be-
tween any i and j, i 6= j. On the one hand, with probability α, i meets j in round t,
and on the other hand, with probability (1−α), i and j do not meet in round 1, but
all other possible meetings take place (i.e. i meets every k 6= j, and all of them meet j
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in round 2). Thus,
u˜i( j|Cn) = α∗δ+(1−α)αn−2αn−1 δ2,
and u˜i as claimed results as u˜i(Cn) =
[
1+(n−1) u˜i( j|Cn)
]
/n.
Proof of Lemma 18 (Wheel, n nodes) The basic idea is the same as in the proof
of Lemma 17, i.e. we define u˜i such that f0 = f˜0 and f1 = f˜1 as defined above. The
number of paths that require 0 or 1 failed meeting in total is larger than above, how-
ever.
Let n denote the central player and let 1, . . . ,n−1 denote the peripheral players.
First, consider the expected utility of the central player n. There are two relevant paths
from any i 6= n to n, namely the immediate one, with probability α, and the delayed
one, with the possibility of going via either peripheral neighbor of i. There are several
ways of defining a function u˜n with the required properties; we choose the following
one.
u˜n =
[
1+(n−1)(αδ+(1−α)α2 (1− (1−α)3)δ2)]/n
Next, fix any peripheral player i 6= n. First, in case n gets the information first, there
are two relevant paths (either i and n meet in the first round or not), and u˜i(n) can be
characterized as follows.
u˜i(n) =
(
1− (1−α)3
)
(1−α) α2 δ2+αδ
Second, in case a peripheral player with distance 1 to i gets the information first, the
expected utility can be characterized as
u˜i(1) =
(
1− (1−α)2
)
(1−α) αδ2+αδ.
Similarly, the expected utilities in the remaining cases, where distances along the
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periphery are 2, 3, or 4+, are characterizable as (in case n≥ 8)
u˜i(2) = 2 (1−α) α2 δ2+
(
1− (1−α)2
)
α2 δ2
u˜i(3) =
((
1− (1−α)2
) (
1− (1−α)3
)
(1−α) α3+
(
1− (1−α)2
)
(1−α) α3
)
δ3+α2 δ2
u˜i(4+) =
((
1− (1−α)3
)
(1−α) α3+(1−α) α2
)
δ3+α2 δ2.
The expected utility overall results as
u˜i =
[
u˜i(n)+1+2 u˜i(1)+2 u˜i(2)+2 u˜i(3)+(n−8) u˜i(4+)
]
/n.
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